INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to shed light on the para-political practices facilitating formal institutional change in a competitive market under specific administrative regime (Sakwa, 2010) .
It deals with the Russian retail trade, which has endured fundamental structural and institutional changes during the years of economic reform. Surprisingly, very little research has been conducted on trade liberalization policy in the post-Communist countries (Frye and Mansfield, 2003) . As for the new phenomenon of reverse movement back to state regulation in the Russian domestic trade, which will be explored here, scholarly literature is virtually absent (for important exceptions, see Daugavet, 2011; Dzagurova and Avdasheva, 2010; Novikov, 2010; Radaev, 2011 ).
This paper begins with a puzzle: after being one of the most liberalized sectors of the Russian economy for 15 years, the retail market has suddenly become subject to nationwide state regulation. We produce a number of alternative hypotheses pointing to potential interests of major political and economic actors in moving from the invisible hand model to the helping hand model of governance (Frye and Shleifer, 1997) . Then a condensed story is presented describing how the new Federal trade law was elaborated and adopted in a process of continuous and furious political contestation. To understand the demands of divergent interest groups, we investigate the background of this intervention, looking for underlying structural, institutional and symbolical factors. We compare evidence obtained in Russia with the U.S.'s attempts to regulate retail chain stores (Ingram and Rao, 2004 ; Klein and Wright, 2007) . We then use quantitative survey data to reveal interest groups that might benefit from the results of state intervention. We also point to the controversial nature of legislative efforts. Finally, we provide explanations for this state intervention, arguing that the actual intentions of public officials and results of intervention deviate remarkably from the declared goals.
PUZZLE: WHY DID THE STATE SUDDENLY COME BACK?
The retail trade enjoyed its status as a significantly liberalized sector in the Russian economy since 1992, when Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed the decree "On Freedom of Trade" that allowed trading activity to be carried out by any legal entity or person without special licensing. Trade liberalization was accompanied by the mass privatization of trading outlets, which were sold out or given away to the working collectives of the shops. Sixty percent of trading outlets were privatized within two years of [1992] [1993] . By the end of the 1990s, non-state retail activity accounted for 96 percent of sales in Russia and 99 percent of sales in Moscow (Radaev, 2007) .
A large percentage of privatized shops were small-sized, and these dispersed assets did not attract the attention of national state regulators. Federal state policy regarding the retail sector was virtually absent. The Federal Customs Service's serious intervention aimed at legalizing import transactions and filling the state budget deficit in the beginning of 2000s was an exception (Radaev, 2002a) . Issues of trading activity were largely on the periphery of the political and expert agenda for at least 15 years.
The absence of a distinct policy does not mean that the existing form of governance entirely corresponded to the invisible hand model and that trading companies escaped from any administrative control. On the municipal level, local trade inspections, fire and sanitary surveillance bodies, tax authorities and law-enforcement agencies made numerous planned and spontaneous visits to trading outlets to enforce a wide range of bureaucratic requirements that no one was able to satisfy fully. The grabbing hands of local inspectors collected formal fines and extorted informal bribes from the companies (Radaev, 2002b) . However, the whole industry of retail trade was not subject to any national economic strategy and federal restrictions. There were several attempts to develop a federal trade law and conception of domestic trade development since the mid-1990s, but the leading policy makers ignored these efforts. Using elements of the new institutionalist approach, we will present an analytical narrative with relevant quantitative data to explicate complex and largely non-transparent mechanisms of institutional building as a highly contested process (Fligstein 1996; 2001) . We assume that the rules constraining and enabling the behavior of market sellers are infused with a variety of meanings that are a subject for diverse interpretations and symbolic struggle.
DATA SOURCES
Data were collected in a research project headed by the author and implemented by the Petrovic and Senauer, 2011). Since the beginning of the 2000s, the grocery sector in Russia presents a case of buyer-driven commodity chains in which retailers are power-advantaged and might abuse their increasing market power that resides in the suppliers' increasing dependence as it was postulated in power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) . Given a lack of bargaining power, the suppliers try to compensate for it by taking a voice strategy and appealing to the public enforcement (Hirschman, 1970 Looking for a variety of explanations, we should not neglect the possibility that the new policy was developed to enhance the controlling capacities of public officials. As the state is supposed to protect broad interests rather than particularistic needs (Reuschemeyer and Evans, 1985) on one side, the public officials could try to meet demands of the final consumers or at least react to articulated public opinion claims (for example, by imposing retail price control).
Indeed, the interests of the final consumers were widely used for justification of state intervention.
On the other side, new regulations could serve the selfish interests of the rent-seeking state bureaucrats. In this case, the new institutional arrangements would not reflect so much a helping hand policy as it was publicly announced, but rather make room for new grabbing hand practices for the advantage of rent-seekers (Frye and Shleifer, 1997 Moreover, they were largely confined to measures restricting activity of the leading retailers.
These provisions included the following: Representatives from the Federal Anti-Trust Service at the expert meetings provided the following explanation for this new administrative barrier. They said that available production capacities in the domestic market were excessive in relation to retail capacities, and that chain stores abused this imbalance to push the producers away from the market. According to this argument, multiple-store companies developed successfully at the expense of declining agricultural production and food processing.
Controversial provisions regarding the necessity of state regulation of maximal (not minimal) retail prices were also suggested in the draft law, despite criticism from independent experts. It was intended to impose limits on the large chain stores if they were proved to be in a dominant position in the market. Obviously, chain store companies were the main subject of administrative restrictions.
In spite of active resistance from the retailers' representatives and independent experts, the draft law was sent out for final intra-governmental approval. It was made clear that the game was over. But suddenly, the whole situation fundamentally changed due to para which was a manifestation of free will and was designed to substitute for more obliging legislative measures. As for the draft trade law, it was "sent for vacations" at least for half a year as it was pronounced by the Ministry officials.
There was an impression that chain stores companies won the game, and the new law would never be adopted. But this impression was wrong, for the suppliers' political lobbyists Contestation over the main provisions of the law came to a final stage. It turned out that retailers' interests were not articulated in the State Duma. At the same time, the Russian MPs demonstrated a striking lack of professional competence, given that the domestic trade was not a subject for federal legislation for quite a long time.
In this situation, the public authorities had to make additional efforts to explore retailersupplier relationships more closely. They could also learn from international experience. After that, the number of court precedents against slotting fees was reduced for both retailers and suppliers (Klein and Wright, 2007) . Additional research conducted by marketing experts also demonstrated that slotting fees should not be interpreted unambiguously as an abuse of market power (Bloom, Gundlach and Cannon, 2000) . What are the most important legislative statements that are aimed at restricting chain store market freedom? First, it is prohibited to include most marketing fees into procurement contracts with suppliers (an exception is made for the volume of sales bonuses, which are limited to 10 percent of the goods' value). The chain store companies have to avoid exclusive contracting and any "entry fees" for placing the goods on their shelves. Additional fees may be subject to separate marketing contracts. However, it is not legitimate for the chain stores to impose these fees as a precondition for signing a major procurement contract.
Second, the length of repayment for supplied goods is legally fixed for chain stores. They are supposed to pay for supplied meat and poultry within 10 days, for most other goods within 45 days, and for alcohol and tobacco within in 75 days.
Third, retailers' gross margin and prices are not limited. However, the Russian Government is supposed to intervene if the price increase on necessities in the stores in any region exceeds 30 percent in 30 days. In this case, the government has a right to fix retail prices in this region for 90 days.
Fourth, one of the most painful statements for the large multiple-store companies prohibits chain stores that obtain 25 percent of the market in a municipal district from opening additional trading outlets in this district. It is remarkable that this chapter first appeared in the text of the draft law on the night before its submission to the State Duma. It was not suggested by the Government draft, demonstrating one more manifestation of the peculiar administrative regime. It is rumored that the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin personally wrote this provision at a closed meeting with the large suppliers' lobbyists. The reduction of the market's spatial borders from large Federal regions to small municipal districts was a novelty, provoking a wave of resistance from the large retailers. Attempts were made to postpone implementation of this rule until 2014, but this idea was rejected and the law was put into operation in July 2010.
We should add that all major arguments in favor of the anti-chain-store regulations were based on a non-disputed idea of retailers' extortive practices. Most of the lawmakers assumed that slotting fees were just a result of policies pursued by the "greedy" chain store companies.
Ritual general references to international experience of retail trade regulation in some European countries like France or Greece were also made to justify the state's intervention. Anti-chain legislation was introduced to impose constraints on the leading retail companies.
The next question is who could eventually benefit from the new trade law.
DISCUSSION: WHO WAS INTERESTED IN BRINGING THE STATE BACK?
The first thing that we have learned from the presented story is that multiple-store companies were by no means interested in the state intervention. Moreover, they did their best to oppose adoption of this Federal law aimed at restricting their market positions. This means that our Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. What could be said about the other interest groups? Let us start with the small independent traders whose interests could be damaged by the chain stores' expansion.
Is there a social movement of small business owners?
The rise of new multiple-store companies has become a remarkable feature of the market It is important to note that this legislation was initiated by associations of small retailers and farmers representing local communities. Apart from the damaged economic interests of small business, the legislation appealed to the fundamental values of American society and combatted deterioration of the local communities, which was viewed as the basis for democratic order. Thus, a grassroots social movement arose to back the anti-chain-store campaign and coordinate an attack on the newly emerging yet dominant organizational form. This public policy attack found its most active support in the states with a large number of independent entrepreneurs. A counteractive pro-chain-store campaign was also developed in the mass media, but it was not as successful. At the same time, the chain store representatives were more effective in organizing privately to defend their interests in the courts.
What was the result of those store wars? Chain stores managed to control institutional change. They stimulated the establishment of associations for the independent producers and farmers, and obtained their support eventually. The chain stores were also forced to sign collective agreements with trade unions (retailers were reluctant to accept these arrangements before the anti-chain-store campaign began). Finally, there was a reverse movement, and at least part of the anti-chain-store legislation was repealed at the end of 1930s (Ingram and Rao, 2004) .
As This history demonstrates that the interests of independent sellers and small business in general were largely used as a rhetorical camouflage for some other purposes, and thus our Hypothesis 2 should be rejected as well.
Transformation of commodity chains and new challenges for suppliers
Our next proposition claims that an increasing demand for the state intervention was In spite of these facts, the necessity of entering chain stores as a strategic target was shaped in the minds of suppliers well before the chain stores started to play a critical role in pure economic terms. This idea no doubt benefited retailers, who gained even more bargaining power.
It made the introduction of new contract arrangements easier.
However, multiple chain stores were confronted with opposition at some point. New institutional arrangements including additional price reductions, slotting allowances, and fees were contested by the suppliers, who viewed them not only as an additional burden by also as unjustified ("unfair") demands. It means that retailers failed to provide cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy for the new organizational forms, which desperately needed this legitimacy at the initial stage when they suffered from the liability of newness (Aldrich, 2000) . It 
Outcomes: did the trade law affect contractual relationships?
The new trade law was largely aimed at balancing the market power in contractual
relationships. To what extent was this aim achieved in practice? To answer this question, we use data from our 2010 standardized survey of 512 managers representing retailers and suppliers in the grocery sector and the home electronic appliances sector in five major Russian cities. We asked our respondents to estimate changes in retailer-supplier relationships which had occurred over the last two or three years before the survey. Our intention was to see whether there was any positive impact of the new trade law.
The first question is whether it is difficult to sign procurement contracts with the exchange partners. Suppliers still complain of difficulties related to the conclusion of these contracts more than retailers (for retail companies, the contract process is less complicated).
Only a few suppliers (5 percent) report that it has become easier to make contracts with large chain stores by the end of 2010 (for small chain stores, 15 percent of suppliers claimed that the process has become easier). At the same time, 20 percent of suppliers point to increasing difficulties in making contracts with large chain stores (it is only 9 percent of suppliers in the case of small chain stores). This observation is supported by our previous research, confirming that it has been always easier for suppliers to deal with the small chain store companies (Radaev, 2011 ). But what is most important here is that 75-80 percent of suppliers and retailers do not see any serious changes in access to the market exchange (see Table 1 ). We next examine changes in the terms and conditions of contractual relationships in more detail. We asked our respondents to assess recent changes in contract elements which were considered the most painful in retailer-supplier relationships, including price discounts, payments delays, slotting allowances, marketing fees, and penalties for noncompliance with contract obligations (Radaev, 2011) .
The surveyed managers do not recognize any serious improvement over time in this respect. Although retailers publicly complain that the new trade law restrains their bargaining power over suppliers, only 7-11 percent of retailers report that they actually reduce contract requirements they make on their suppliers (it is 17 percent in case of marketing fees but this level is still relatively low). At the same time, only a small percentage of retailers (14 percent) admit that they increase their demands on the suppliers, even in the case of increasing price discounts which were declared as a major instrument for compensation of retailers' losses from the new administrative constraints. In all other cases, increases in contractual demands are even less frequent (see Table 4 ).
As for the suppliers that are supposed to benefit from the new law, their estimations are remarkably more negative. Only 3-5 percent of suppliers report experiencing some decrease in contract requirements. In case of marketing fees, this group increases to 10 percent, but still it is not enough to claim that the trade law produces any significant positive outcomes for suppliers.
Negative outcomes are faced much more frequently and reported by 14-34 percent of suppliers depending on the contract elements. We might expect it in case of price discounts, which are not limited by the new trade law. But we might expect better results in relation to payment delays and slotting fees that have been restrained by this law.
As for the main empirical results of this part of the study, the situation has not changed for 75-85 percent of retailers and 70-80 percent of suppliers regarding nearly all contractual elements (see Table 4 ). In sum, the changes are not very significant and largely contradict previous expectations. It would be reasonable to ask market sellers which groups of actors have benefited from the new legislative arrangements. Considering the most widespread justifications provided by proponents of the trade law, we could expect at least three necessary results:
(1) Small business should win as compared to large companies;
(2) Suppliers should benefit much more than retailers; and (3) Consumers should benefit from the law more than public officials.
To test these propositions, we asked a set of direct questions to our respondents trying to reveal which groups benefited from the trade law almost a year after it was implemented.
According to our data, none of three predictions came true. Second, contrary to previous expectations, no significant advantages of suppliers are observed as compared to retailers. The share of retailers pointing to the suppliers as winners from the trade law arrangements is just 5-6 percent higher than the share of retailers who believe that they themselves have won. Suppliers express even more criticism and point to benefits for themselves even less frequently (see Table 5 ). Thus, none of the partners of the market exchanges recognize a significant positive impact of the new trade law on the bargaining power of suppliers.
Third, many of the trade law proponents referred to the interests of final consumers. Our obtained data demonstrate that consumers also did not benefit much from this law. Only 24 percent of retailers and 22 percent of suppliers think that the trade law affected final consumers in a positive way (see Table 5 ). Retailers and suppliers at least believed that consumers benefited much less than the large market sellers.
Public officials are regarded as winners from the new law much more often than consumers; 40 percent of retailers and 56 percent of suppliers make this claim in our survey. It is remarkable that the number of suppliers pointing to the public officials as winners is significantly higher than that of retailers. It indicates the suppliers' disappointment with regard to the trade law and state regulators claiming that they were defending the interests of suppliers. At the same time, the trade law enhanced the capacities of public officials rather than capacities of market sellers and final consumers, in accordance with our Hypothesis 4.
Administrative costs for all market sellers have increased. It would be reasonable to assume that the basic intentions of the trade law initiators could be different from the announced goals. While the average penalty may not seem very high, this sum does not cover legal expenses and the cost of documents provided for justifications that could be much more significant, especially for smaller businesses.
Subversion of anti-trust policy
We have reasons to expect that the burden of penalties may be raised in the future. By the end of 2010, the State Duma increased the upper limit of fixed penalties from 1 million to 5 million rubles. This amount could be difficult not only for small businesses, but also for medium-sized regional sellers.
It is important to note that the ambitions of the Anti-Trust Service as a major enforcement agency extended far beyond protection of competition within the last decade. Its activity is aimed at maintaining a balance of interests between market players. They want not only to remove administrative barriers, but also to facilitate principles of fair exchange, which is a much more When monitoring price dynamics, the state sends a strong signal to the leading sellers persuading them to use more cautious and restrictive pricing policies. Companies that allow significant price increases on basic consumer goods run the risk of being accused of tacit collusions and taken to arbitration court by the territorial branches of Federal Anti-Trust Service.
It means that the liberal rhetoric of the competition protection camouflages the intentions of administrative control over market practices, and we have an example of anti-trust policy subversion. Economically, this kind of populist policy is both controversial and utopian when trying to stop inflation by administrative measures. But at the same time, state officials attain some political results by demonstrating to the public that they are fighting against "dishonest market dealers" responsible for price increases. Their actions are not driven by intentions to protect suppliers, as it was publicly announced, but by a willingness to establish political and administrative control over large and medium-sized business in a rapidly developing market. Third, the law intervenes into contractual relations of the market sellers despite the economists' authoritative conclusions that such an intervention might reduce incentives for investment and contaminate contract discipline (Joskow, 2002) . Moreover, the law is aimed at protecting one side of the market exchange from the other. With some exceptions, it does not suggest symmetrical restrictions for suppliers even when their market share is high (which is a frequent case in the local markets) 6 .
CONCLUSIONS
Fourth, as a result of political pressures, the law is largely non-transparent and allows ambivalent interpretations by different public officials and lawyers. Market sellers are assured that everything will be clarified through the arbitration court precedents. Thus, final decisions are largely left for judicial discretion, while the court lawyers do not have a sufficient competence and experience in such cases. This kind of uncertainty does not make market sellers happy and does not stimulate further investments.
In sum, the new trade law leads to a new type of institutional trap. Although it was aimed at protecting competition, it is clearly directed against competitive development of chain stores companies establishing new trading formats and may stimulate adverse selection of suppliers.
The introduction of the Federal trade law was justified by the need to protect the interests of domestic suppliers against dominant multiple store companies. Many experts interpreted this intervention as a result of state capture by the large producers, who compensated for their decreasing bargaining power with effective lobbying capacities. This kind of domestic suppliers' lobbying did take place, and there might be some attempts of state capture. However, we suggest an alternative interpretation. According to the obtained empirical evidence, it is public officials rather than market sellers that benefited from the new legislation and regulative practices. We argue that public officials largely pretended to give a helping hand to the domestic producers while they pursued their own economic policies, heavily backed by non-economic considerations. The suppliers' claims were intentionally used to attain a different political goal of developing new instruments of administrative control over the market.
As a result, benefits for market sellers from the new trade law adoption are not so evident. For most sellers, contractual terms and conditions have not significantly changed, and we observe disappointment in the regulatory outcomes. Along with unfulfilled promises, the administrative costs and level of uncertainty caused by additional regulations increased for both retailers and suppliers.
We are reluctant to confine our explanations to public officials' willingness to extend a grabbing hand though additional controlling functions to increase their capacity to raise administrative rent. We would like to avoid this kind of simplification and instead consider the trade law as an attempt to develop new instruments of political control over large and mediumsized businesses, camouflaged by liberal rhetorical statements.
